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Complex operations encompass stability, security, transition and recon-
struction, and counterinsurgency operations and operations consisting of
irregular warfare (United States Public Law No 417, 2008). Stability opera-
tions frameworks engage many disciplines to achieve their goals, including
establishment of safe and secure environments, the rule of law, social well-
being, stable governance, and sustainable economy. A comprehensive
approach to complex operations involves many elements—governmental
and nongovernmental, public and private—of the international community
or a “whole of community” effort, as well as engagement by many different
components of government agencies, or a “whole of government” approach.
Taking note of these requirements, a number of studies called for incentives
to grow the field of capable scholars and practitioners, and the development
of resources for educators, students and practitioners. A 2008 United States
Institute of Peace study titled “Sharing the Space” specifically noted the
need for case studies and lessons. Gabriel Marcella and Stephen Fought
argued for a case-based approach to teaching complex operations in the
pages of Joint Forces Quarterly, noting “Case studies force students into the
problem; they put a face on history and bring life to theory.” We developed
this series of complex operations teaching case studies to address this need.
In this process, we aim to promote research and to strengthen relationships
among civilian and military researchers and practitioners. 
The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) emphasizes the impor-
tance of a whole of government approach to complex operations and pro-
vides a forum for a community of practice and plays a number of roles in the
production and distribution of learning about complex operations, includ-
ing supporting the compilations of lessons and practices. 
Dr. Karen Guttieri at the Naval Postgraduate School provided the
research direction and overall leadership for this project.
Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, Washington, DC 20319.
© 2010 by National Defense University. All rights reserved. Published 2010.
Note: The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. government or 
National Defense University. Material in this case study may be used with approriate citation.
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I have never yet found a contractor who, if not watched, would not leave the
government holding the bag.
Senator Harry S. Truman, 1941
Any military that intends to be relevant beyond its national borders will be
working with the private sector.
Doug Brooks, President
International Peace Operations Association, 2008
INTRODUCTION
September 16, 2007, approximately 12:08 p.m., Nisour Square, Baghdad
City. The white Kia sedan had finally come to a complete stop, its chassis
riddled with bullet holes. Its occupants, an Iraqi medical student and his
physician mother, had both been killed in a barrage of gunfire. The chaos
had begun just fifteen minutes before, with the nearby detonation of a bomb
while a heavily armed convoy was rushing American VIPs through the
crowded streets of the Iraqi capital. When the shooting stopped, seventeen
Iraqis were dead and many more wounded. Were these just more unfortu-
nate casualties of the Iraq War? Was this business as usual in the hot zone of
a complex and dangerous occupation? Or did something go really wrong
here?
What complicates the scenario further is the fact that the shooters were
employees of Blackwater Worldwide, a North Carolina-based private secu-
rity company. Blackwater had been operating in Iraq since the summer of
2003 after receiving a $27 million no-bid contract to provide security for
Ambassador J. Paul Bremer, then head of the Coalition Provisional Author-
ity (CPA).1 The Iraq War was a watershed event for a rapidly growing pri-
vate security industry that today populates and defines postwar stabilization
and reconstruction efforts. At the time of this writing, there are nearly two
hundred thousand individuals working on contract in Iraq—considerably
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more than there are coalition military troops. Doug Brooks, president of the
International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), the private security
industry’s trade organization, opined in a 2008 article that “every military
that expects to be relevant beyond its national borders in the future will be
working with the private sector.”2 Well-known commentator Robert Kaplan
agrees: “The idea of a large American military presence anywhere without
contractors is now unthinkable.”3
The vast majority of those contractors fulfill logistics and operational
support functions (such as cooks, construction workers, mechanics, or truck
drivers). Yet an estimated twenty-five to thirty thousand contractors pro-
vide security or security support services. About three-quarters of the 7,300
private security personnel working for the Department of Defense (DOD)
in Iraq carry weapons and are authorized to use force in self-defense, in
defense of persons they are contracted to protect, or to prevent threats
against the life of civilians.4 
The Nisour Square shootings were by no means an isolated incident. But
it was the bloodiest in a series of violent episodes involving Blackwater and
other American contractors since the occupation began. A congressional
investigation following the September 2007 incident revealed that “Black-
water has been involved in at least 195 ‘escalation of force’ incidents in Iraq
since 2005 that involved the firing of shots by Blackwater forces.” This, the
report continued, “is an average of 1.4 shootings per week.”5 Coming on the
heels of the Abu-Ghraib prison scandal, concerns about the indiscriminate
use of force stoked anger and resentment among the Iraqi government and
people.6
Demanding the dismissal of Blackwater from the U.S. government’s pay-
roll, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki explained after the Nisour Square
shooting: “What happened was a crime. It has left a deep grudge and anger,
both inside the government and among the Iraqi people.”7 
Although Congress, in the fiscal year 2007 Defense Budget appropria-
tions bill, had already conceded that private security contractors working
with the U.S. military and embassy staff would no longer enjoy immunity,
the Bush administration rejected demands for the ouster of Blackwater.8 In
January 2009, the Iraqi government finally rejected a renewal of Blackwa-
ter’s license to operate, effectively banning the company from Iraq.
The first section of this case traces the history and rise of the security
industry and categorizes the types of firms providing security and security
support services. Next, the case illustrates the reasons and motivations for
individuals to seek employment as security contractors and discusses the
implications of the growing market for privatizing security for the U.S. mili-
tary. Finally, the case explores the advantages and shortcomings of outsourc-
ing security functions and illustrates some of the dilemmas associated with
“security by contract.”
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THE RISE OF AN INDUSTRY
A 2008 report from the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
that between 2003 and 2007, U.S. government agencies awarded contracts
totalling around $85 billion to private sector companies performing services
in the Iraqi theatre. In 2008, these companies employed some 190,000 on-
site individuals, approximately as many as there were U.S. soldiers deployed
at the height of the Iraq War and “at least 2.5 times higher than that ratio
during any other major U.S. conflict.”9 As of May 2009, there had been a
confirmed 451 contractor casualties in Iraq.10 
Of course, the use of contractor personnel in the theatre of operations is
not new. Throughout history, states hired outsiders to fight their battles. “In
some eras,” Peter Singer, director of the Brookings Institution’s 21st Century
Defense Initiative and an expert on private security issues, acknowledges,
“these private entrants into conflict were individual foreigners, brought in to
fight for whichever side bid the highest, known as ‘mercenaries’ in common
parlance. In other periods, they came in the form of highly organized enti-
ties. For both, the important factor was their goal: private profit, derived
from the very act of fighting.”11
For example, during the American Revolutionary War, George Washing-
ton contracted with civilian merchants to deliver supplies to his troops. At
the same time, German landgraves (erstwhile German noblemen with juris-
diction over a particular territory) sold into service some thirty thousand
soldiers as auxiliaries to the British to fight against the American revolution-
aries. These so-called Hessians12 were not mercenaries in the strict sense, as
they did not voluntarily hire out their services for money. Instead, as in
many eighteenth century armies, most of these soldiers were conscripts,
debtors, or petty criminals who fought for low pay and, in some cases,
received nothing but their daily food. 
Apart from those outsourced combat functions, field armies during the
1700s and 1800s relied on contracted wagons, drivers, and civilians to per-
form construction functions and almost all medical care.14 During World
War II, contractor functions expanded to address the increasingly complex
technical needs posed by maintenance of military aircraft, vehicles, and sig-
nal equipment. Reliance on contractors rose further during the Korean and
Vietnam wars in support of weapons systems, establishing base camps and
depots, and providing logistical functions. For instance, by one estimate,
“More than 50 percent of the direct-support helicopter maintenance needed
during those two wars was provided by contractors.”15
With the inception of the all-volunteer force in the 1970s, concern
mounted about the military’s reliance on contractor support. A 1982
Defense Science Board report noted that despite satisfactory performance
during crises and combat, “there were no formal mechanisms to ensure
[contractors’] continued performance.”16 Subsequently, DOD reversed
course and steered maintenance away from contractors and back toward
Source: Human Rights First13
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“organic” sources. According to DOD Directive 1130.2, issued in January
1983:17 
Contractor field services (CFS) . . . shall be used when necessary to accomplish
military mission, when provision of services by DOD engineering and technical
services specialists is impractical and when required skills are not available
within the Military Departments . . . the use of CFS is limited to a period not to
exceed 12 months after the DOD components achieve self-sufficiency in the use
of new equipment or systems.”
In July 1990, however, the pendulum swung the other direction again
and the Pentagon cancelled Directive 1130.2. During operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm, the U.S. military used civilian contractors exten-
sively, yet nowhere near where contractor engagement would be a decade-
and-a-half later: in all, the Pentagon engaged seventy-six contractors who
deployed some 9,200 employees to Iraq in support of Gulf War I. The Pen-
tagon hired its contractors on hundreds of separate contracts. Not surpris-
ingly, the results were mixed. A number of contracts contained poorly
defined statements of work or none at all and oftentimes ambiguous con-
tract requirements. As a result, many contractors performed inadequately
and inefficiently and left their customers dissatisfied.18 
Filling the Security Vacuum
What prompted the corporate evolution of services supporting military
operations? What factors sparked the rapid and unrestrained rise of the pri-
vate security industry between the two Gulf wars? Singer attributes the
privatization of security to three dynamics: “The end of the Cold War, trans-
formations in the nature of warfare that blurred the lines between soldiers
and civilians, and a general trend toward privatization and outsourcing of
government functions around the world.”19 
More specifically, a combination of force downsizing—the number of
soldiers worldwide declined by about one-third, from twenty-nine to twenty
million between 1988 and 200220—and higher demand for force contribu-
tions to provide aid or support military interventions created the higher
demand for private security.21 By and large, private military actors, Singer
found, particularly thrive in “periods of systemic transition” and “areas of
weak governance.”22
The end of the Cold War “provided a vacuum in the market of security.”
At the same time as militaries downsized and investments in the “peace divi-
dend” rose, global threats became “more varied, more capable, and more
dangerous.”23 While many had hoped for a “new world order,”24 states col-
lapsed, inciting widespread instability and violence virtually anywhere but in
the developed Western world. Commentator Robert Kaplan predicted the
“coming anarchy” as a result of these failures of governance.25 
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Simultaneously, globalization, including the post-Cold War opening of
international markets, produced mixed results for different parts of the
world, leaving the “bottom billion,” as renowned World Bank economist
Paul Collier calls the least developed, in poverty, malnourished, underedu-
cated, marginalized, and disconnected.26 According to Peter Singer, those
with little hope constitute “a huge reserve for the illegal economy, organized
crime, and armed conflict.”27 The combination of a growing number of dis-
affected and an oversupply of dislocated military-aged labor provided a mar-
ket flood of soldiers ready to fight for whoever not only paid the bill but also
offered a means of subsistence. 
With large budget cuts and force reductions, an emerging need for inter-
national interventions to curb civil war, the prevalence of ethnic strife and
genocide, and a rapidly growing demand by weak or besieged governments
for contracted fighting services, the conditions were ripe for the rise of the
private security industry. 
Security, Inc.
To date, there is neither a universal, agreed definition of the label “private
security contractor” nor a common understanding of how to classify the
firms providing security functions. Brookings Institution expert Singer dis-
tinguishes three types of firms:28
• Military provider firms, such as Executive Outcomes and Sandline
International (both now defunct), supply combat-type services,
including participation in actual fighting. These firms function as
force multipliers for their clients, who typically include weak or fragile
states having relatively low military capability and facing immediate
and high-threat situations.29 
• Military consulting firms offer advisory and training services, thus
assisting a client’s armed forces. Although these firms do not them-
selves operate on the battlefield, they provide strategic, operational,
and/or organizational analysis—known in military terminology as
the “commander’s estimate.” 
• Military support firms provide supplementary military services,
including logistics, intelligence, technical support, supply, and trans-
portation, thereby freeing up the client’s military capability to focus
on core combat functions. 
Referring to the security industry as the “peace and stability” or “contin-
gency” industry, IPOA classifies its corporate members into three sectors:30
• Logistics and support companies provide logistics and supply, threat
assessment, consultancy, mine clearance, medical services, construc-
tion and engineering services, and waste management. 
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• Private security companies (PSCs) offer security-related services,
including personal protection (also known as a protective security
detail); static site security (for example, government buildings or
training facilities); protection of critical infrastructure (for example,
ports, oil installations and pipelines, power stations, and power lines);
convoy protection; and security consulting, planning, and advice.
Although contractors working this type of security detail in Iraq and
Afghanistan almost invariably carry weapons, they are not permitted
to engage in offensive combat operations and are authorized to use
force only in self-defense. 
• Development and security sector reform companies provide services
aiding security sector reform, which typically entails reducing the size,
budget, and reach of the military, police, secret services, intelligence,
and the justice system and reforming them to become more transpar-
ent and accountable to their citizens, and supporting democracy and
governance, economic and business development, and crisis mitiga-
tion and recovery.
THRILL RIDE VS. PAYCHECK
The September 2004 issue of Rolling Stone featured the story of an American
tattoo artist, rock singer, and former Marine who made his living selling
armed protective services in Iraq.31 Coming on the heels of the mutilation of
four Blackwater contractors in Fallujah in April 2004 and the horrible pic-
tures of the prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib prison that had made headlines
earlier that same year, the growing involvement of private security firms in
the war against terrorism came to the forefront of public attention. 
Moreover, the picture of the industry painted in the media was less than
flattering. Many commentators quickly likened individual security contrac-
tors to greedy, ruthless, and unscrupulous mercenaries, “freelance soldiers . .
. who, for large amounts of money, fight for dubious causes.”32 Some com-
mentators began comparing the booming security market to the Alaskan
Gold Rush. For instance, the Times of London asserted, “In Iraq, the post-
war business boom is not oil. It is security.”33
IPOA president Doug Brooks sharply criticizes this sort of sensationalist
news reporting: “The reality is that our members specialize in providing crit-
ical services professionally and ethically in chaotic environments. Such oper-
ations are inherently risky, and implementation is always challenging but too
often misunderstood and misconstrued by outsiders. Frequently we find
ourselves responding to inaccuracies propagated by irresponsible journal-
ists, activists, and even academics.”34
Mercenaries differ from both professional soldiers and from most private
security contractors in that they fight for employers other than their home
government. According to the 1977 Additional Protocol of the 1949
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Geneva Convention, a mercenary takes part in the fighting but is neither a
national nor member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict. Instead,
he is “motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for pri-
vate gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict,
material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to
combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that
Party.”35
An October 2007 report by the UN Working Group on Mercenaries
concluded that “a number of private security companies operating in zones
of armed conflict are engaging in new forms of mercenarism” and warned
that “states that employ these services may be responsible for violations of
internationally recognized human rights committed by the personnel of
such companies.”36 The working group also expressed concern that only
thirty states had ratified the International Convention against the Recruit-
ment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries and that the United
States has neither signed nor ratified the UN Mercenary Convention or the
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention.
Rejecting the UN report, a spokesman for the U.S. mission of the UN
offices in Geneva released a statement denying that security guards working
under U.S. contract in Iraq were mercenaries: “Accusations that U.S. gov-
ernment-contracted security guards, of whatever nationality, are mercenar-
ies is inaccurate and demeaning to men and women who put their lives on
the line to protect people and facilities every day. . . . The security guards
working for U.S. government contractors in Iraq and elsewhere protect
clearly defined United States government areas, and their work is defensive
in nature.”37
With the end of the Cold War, contracting their professional skills to
security firms became hugely attractive to scores of individuals with a con-
siderable range of differing experiences and qualifications. Eager to expand
business and profits, Blackwater, for instance, actively recruited highly quali-
fied ex-Special Forces soldiers to deploy in Iraq and offered them salaries
that dwarfed basic military pay. Clearly, “When a guy can make more money
in one month than he can make all year in the military or in a civilian job, it’s
hard to turn down,” explains ex-Navy SEAL (Sea, Air, Land) Dale McClel-
lan, one of the original founders of Blackwater.38
Today, the private military contractors (PMC) Web site advertises:
“The pay for PMC’s in dangerous places like Iraq is generous. Experienced
people can make $500–750 a day. But it’s not all for the money, for many it’s
a new career path that has a sense of duty for country while helping to assist
in building a new democracy.”39
And indeed, it is not all about the pay. Contracting offers “a chance for
many combat enthusiasts, retired from the service and stuck in the ennui of
everyday existence, to return to their glory days on the battlefield under the
banner of the international fight against terrorism.”40 As a former Navy
SEAL explains, “It’s what you do. Say you spent twenty years doing things
like riding high-speed boats and jumping out of airplanes. Now, all of a
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sudden, you’re selling insurance. It’s tough.” For a fifty-five-year old police
officer, the decision to sign on with Blackwater meant “the last chance in my
life to do something exciting.”41
A senior vice president for one of the U.S.-based security firms describes
the contractor motivation this way: “We found that their military experience
has provided an interesting culture for many of our employees. Collabora-
tion and team cohesion, hierarchy of command, comradery, they enjoy this.
Yes, money is also a motivating factor, but what drives people is their desire
to serve their country in an indirect way and get the team cohesion they are
accustomed to.”42
The majority of contractors, expert-author Robert Young Pelton found,
are “ex-military or police who have realized that their specialized training
has limited value in the civilian world, and who, in order to provide well for
their families, take serious risks for the healthy pay it affords. However,
roughly 10 percent of those I have met consider themselves professional
career contractors who do it because they enjoy strapping on armor and
heavy weapons for the well-paying, high-risk, adrenaline-packed thrill
ride.”43 And the industry is sufficiently diverse to provide employment for
individuals with very different professional backgrounds and personal moti-
vations.
Defining a professional profile for security contractors proves difficult.
“Blackwater is like a fucking restaurant. You’ve got hundreds of people com-
ing through. They usually fall into two categories. You’ve got the under-
thirty crowd—the whippersnappers just looking for the biggest paycheck.
Then you got the over-thirty crowd—the guys with a family and kids that
are looking for a company to work for.”44 
Most important for companies is to choose and train the right people.
Today, security firms subject potential employees to a fairly rigorous vetting
process. The American security firm senior vice president explains, “As in
many industries, there is a lot of hype early on. And if it is a rapidly growing
industry, there may be problems with vetting early on as well. But the mar-
ket has weeded out those companies that have not behaved ethically, legally
or morally. At my company, we have a very detailed vetting system. We use
psychometric tools for selecting employees, which helps us determine
whether they fit in the culture and how they will operate under stress. We
are confident that we can weed out potential problem employees.”45
MCARMY VS. MACARTHUR 
When General Douglas MacArthur addressed the graduating class at West
Point in 1962, he told them: “Duty, honor, country: Those three hallowed
words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you
will be.”46 But the U.S. military has changed significantly since those days.
Shortly after the inception of the all-volunteer force, sociologist Charles
Moskos observed that the military was moving from a traditional institu-
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tional structure to a civilian or occupational format. Military service as a
“calling to the nation” was giving way to being “just another job.”47 Moskos
concluded that the U.S. military was shifting from an institutional format,
legitimated by values and norms transcending individual self-interest in
favor of a presumed higher good, to an occupational format, legitimated pri-
marily in terms of marketplace concerns instead of normative consider-
ations. 
This shift has considerably impacted recruitment, retention, and
rewards. Tim Horton, now head of public relations for Logistical Supply
Area Anaconda in Balad, the biggest U.S. base in Iraq, and a transportation
officer with twenty years of military experience, explains:
What we have today is an all-volunteer army, unlike in a conscription army
when they had to be here. In the old army, the standard of living was low, the
pay scale was dismal; it wasn’t fun; it wasn’t intended to be fun. But today we
have to appeal, we have to recruit, just like any corporation, we have to recruit
off the street. And after we get them to come in, it behooves us to give them a
reason to stay in.48
What does it take to keep soldiers in the military? Horton says, “There
are some creature comforts in this Wal-Mart and McDonald’s society that
we live in that soldiers have come to expect. They expect to play Xbox, to
keep in touch by e-mail. They expect to eat a variety of foods.”49 Gone are
the MREs (meals-ready-to-eat) that soldiers solidarily complained about for
decades. Today, soldiers take their chow at buffet-style cafeterias, wandering
between the omelet station, soft drink fountains, and salad and dessert
bars—all of course staffed by private contractors.
At a time when the military is overstretched and deployments are
extended involuntarily, recruitment easily falls short of its target, and reten-
tion becomes an issue, especially when individuals with expert military skills
can more than double their pay by “going private.” As demand for security
experts increases, the U.S. military finds itself in a new position—competing
in the marketplace for the best and the brightest. 
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates expressed his concern about these
developments in the fall of 2007: “[M]y personal concern about some of
these security contracts is that I worry that sometimes the salaries they are
able to pay in fact lures some of our soldiers out of the service to go to work
for them.” Gates was so concerned that he asked the Pentagon to work
toward including “non-compete clauses” in military contracts in order to
“put some limits on the ability of these contracts to lure highly trained sol-
diers out of our forces and work for them.”50
Asked about Secretary Gates’s recommendation during the Blackwater
hearing following the Nisour Square shooting, the company’s founder, Erik
Prince, responded that he had no objections against a “non-compete
clause,” but he believed that “it would be upsetting to a lot of soldiers if they
didn’t have the ability to use the skills they learned in the military in the
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private sector.”51 When asked about his company’s profits during the same
hearing, Prince simply told the House Oversight Committee: “We’re a pri-
vate company . . . and there’s a key word there—private.”52 
For Doug Brooks, “Too much is made of the competition between army
and private sector”:
[T]he pay ain’t as good as it is made out to be—the benefits that are given to
U.S. troops are pretty damn good, and if you include those in [the pay] it is
almost a wash. Contractors do have a higher proportion of cash in their pay, but
ONLY when they’re actually working. . . . [Y]ou’re only employed half the
time—if you’re lucky. And much of your unemployed time is spent trying to
line up your next contract. So split the $500–700 in half, take away the benefits
and the contracting jobs don’t look so sexy compared to military life. If you’re
particularly professional and experienced then the money can be good, for the
vast majority it ain’t a long career choice.53
OUTSOURCING: THE ART OF CUTTING WASTE
In 1982, faced by growing federal deficits, President Ronald Reagan set up
the Private Sector Survey on Cost Control to root out waste and inefficiency
in the federal government. Its chairman, conservative industrialist J. Peter
Grace, concluded, “government-run enterprises lack the driving forces of
marketplace competition, which promote tight, efficient operations.”54 By
contrast, “[t]urn government operations over to the private sector and you
get innovation, efficiency, flexibility.”55
Almost immediately upon taking office in 1993, the Clinton administra-
tion implemented a 40 percent drop in the U.S. defense budget and reduced
force levels by more than 30 percent to about 1.4 million troops. With grow-
ing concern over the efficiency of the federal bureaucracy, the Clinton
administration and Congress challenged federal agencies to become more
performance oriented and cost-effective by adapting “performance-based”
management concepts from industry. And a decade later, the Office of Man-
agement and Budget reported “cost savings in a range of 20 to 50 percent
when federal and private sector service providers compete to perform these
functions.”56 
On September 10, 2001, precisely one day before the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told senior staff that the
Pentagon was wasting $3 billion a year by not outsourcing many noncombat
duties to the private sector:
Why is DOD one of the last organizations around that still cuts its own checks?
When an entire industry exists to run warehouses efficiently, why do we own
and operate so many of our own? At bases around the world, why do we pick up
our own garbage and mop our own floors, rather than contracting services out,
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as many businesses do? And surely we can outsource more computer systems
support.57
In an effort to clarify the scope of outsourcing, the 2001 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) Report emphasized that “only those functions that
must be performed by DOD should be kept by DOD. Any function that can
be provided by the private sector is not a core government function.”58 The
2001 QDR required DOD to separate its functions into “core” and “non-
core” in terms of whether or not each is directly necessary for warfighting.
As a result, functions now fall into three broad categories: 
• Functions directly linked to warfighting and best performed by the
federal government. In these areas, DOD will invest in process and
technology to improve performance.
• Functions indirectly linked to warfighting capability that must be
shared by the public and private sectors. In these areas, DOD will
seek to define new models of public–private partnerships to improve
performance.
• Functions not linked to warfighting and best performed by the private
sector. In these areas, DOD will seek to privatize or outsource entire
functions or define new mechanisms for partnerships with private
firms or other public agencies.59
In part because of the uneven contractor performance during the first
Gulf War, the U.S. Army began using a contract system known as the Logis-
tical Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) in the early 1990s.60 Four LOG-
CAP contracts have been awarded since 1992: LOGCAP I (1992–1997)
was awarded to Brown and Root Services (now Kellogg, Brown & Root
[KBR], since 2007 a subsidiary of Halliburton Corporation) for logistics
support in several regions including the Balkans; LOGCAP II (1997–2002)
went to Dyncorps International for peacebuilding work in Bosnia; and
LOGCAP III was competitively awarded to KBR in December 2001 primar-
ily for support of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Djibouti, Jordan,
Kenya, Uzbekistan, and Georgia.61 While LOGCAP I cost $815 million,
LOGCAP III cost American taxpayers more than $15 billion in its first three
years alone.62 
With the current LOGCAP IV, the Army awarded four performance
contractors in 2007 to deliver services, including supply operations, field
operations, engineering and construction, communication networks, trans-
portation and cargo, facilities maintenance, and repair. Under LOGCAP IV,
“performance contractors will compete for individual LOGCAP task orders,
fostering a competitive situation designed to control costs and enhance
quality.”63 
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Cost Savings Is Big Business
Security contracting is big business. From 2003 through 2007, U.S. govern-
ment agencies obligated a total of $85 billion for contracts principally per-
formed in the Iraqi theatre. This accounts for almost 20 percent of the $446
billion appropriated in toto for activities in Iraq but does not include con-
tracts supporting operations in Iraq that are performed outside the Iraqi the-
atre. 
For the eighteen-month period 2007 through the first half of 2008, the
Government Accountability Office reported that DOD, State, and the U.S.
Agency for International Development spent at least $33.9 billion on almost
fifty-seven thousand contracts for efforts such as construction, capacity
building, security, and a range of support services for U.S. forces and other
government personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. About three-fourths of the
reported obligations were for contracts with performance in Iraq.64
The CBO estimates that the total U.S. government spending on private
security services was $6 billion–$10 billion over 2003–2007, with $3 bil-
lion–$4 billion allocated to private security contractors operating in Iraq.65
Similarly, the IPOA’s Doug Brooks estimates the annual value of providing
private security services to contingency operations worldwide at $20 billion,
of which private security companies accounted for U.S.-$2 billion–$4 bil-
lion.66
Does outsourcing security achieve its objectives and save money? In the
aftermath of the Nisour Square incident, Congress held a hearing in Octo-
ber 2007 to inquire whether the government’s heavy reliance on private
security contractors was a wise use of taxpayer funds.67 According to con-
tract documents, Blackwater had billed the U.S. government $1,222 per day
for each individual protective security specialist, amounting to $455,000 per
contractor per year. By comparison, an Army sergeant at the time earned
between $140 and $190 per day in pay and benefits, for a total of $50,000 to
$70,000 per year. And, as commanding general of the Multinational Force
Iraq, General David Petraeus was making about $180,000 per year.
However, a recent CBO study asserts that these figures skew the com-
parative analysis of the cost-effectiveness of outsourcing security functions,
since the $1,222 per day reflects the contractor’s billing rate, not the amount
paid to the individual employee. By its very nature, the billing rate will have
to exceed pay, because it includes the contractor’s indirect cost, overhead,
and profit. Instead, the CBO suggests, [a] better comparison would involve
a soldier’s ‘billing rate’—the total cost to the government of having soldiers
fill the deployed security positions for one year.”68 In addition, the CBO
report concludes that contractors generally bid various numbers of person-
nel in different labor categories, so a singular focus on security guards fur-
ther skews the assessment. 
To get a better comparison, the CBO performed an analysis reflecting all
types of personnel as well as nonlabor costs (for example, vehicles and other
equipment):
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That analysis indicates that the costs of the private contractor did not differ
greatly from the costs of having a comparable military unit performing similar
functions. During peacetime, however, the military unit would remain in the
force structure and continue to accrue costs at a peacetime rate, whereas the pri-
vate security contract would not have to be renewed.69 
These calculations are based on the salaries of American contractors.
The IPOA’s Doug Brooks says, however, “Hire Iraqis to guard bases who
know the culture, pay them market value of $700 per month instead of
$15,000, and you can really save cost. One thing that is completely over-
looked is the benefits this brings to the local population. Contractors com-
pete with one another, so they will hire locals. That is cheaper, and they
provide skills training and employment.”70
Maximizing Profit
Of course, all cost-benefit calculations assume effective management and
oversight. But especially in times of inordinate growth of a specialized indus-
try, overpricing and cheating become a concern. And indeed, reports
abound that charge security contractors with fraud, overbilling, wasteful
spending, and “inadequate planning and inadequate oversight.”71 For
instance, the Pentagon’s own auditing office found that KBR may have
billed DOD for 36 percent more meals than it actually provided. According
to the Raleigh, NC, News & Observer, Blackwater paid its employees $600
per day but billed Dubai-based Regency Hotel and Hospital Company
$815. Regency, in turn, billed Eurest Support Services (ESS), who billed
KBR, who billed the federal government an undisclosed amount.72
The News & Observer described how overbilling worked in the case of
one individual contractor working for Blackwater:
Blackwater added a 36 percent markup, plus its overhead costs, and sent the bill
to a Kuwaiti company that ordinarily runs hotels. That company, Regency
Hotel, tacked on its costs for buying vehicles and weapons and a profit and sent
an invoice to a German food services company called ESS that cooked meals for
the troops. ESS added its costs and profit and sent its bill to Halliburton, which
also added overhead and a profit and presented the final bill to the Pentagon. It
is nearly impossible to say whether the cost . . . doubled, tripled or quadru-
pled.73
While potential cost savings are powerful incentives for outsourcing gov-
ernment functions, the private sector’s motivation is to maximize profit. The
problem, industry expert Peter Singer says, is that “the incentives of a private
company do not always align with the clients’ interests—or the public good.
In an ideal world, this problem would be kept in check through proper
management and oversight; in reality, such scrutiny is often absent.”74
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Allegations of war-profiteering as a result of open-ended, “cost-plus” con-
tracts outraged members of Congress and the American public. 
Early in the Iraq War, things had really run out of control. Henry Bun-
ting, a retired Army staff sergeant and former Halliburton purchasing officer,
said he “heard a common refrain in 2003 in Kuwait from managers of KBR . .
.: ‘Don’t worry about price. It’s cost-plus.’” Bunting continued, “[t]here is no
question the taxpayer is getting screwed. There is no incentive for KBR or
their subs to try to reduce costs. No matter what it costs, KBR gets 100 per-
cent back, plus overhead, plus their profit.”75 
Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA) was furious: “Halliburton is
gouging the taxpayer.”76 According to David Walker, the comptroller gen-
eral of the United States, “The outsourcing of government has escalated
across the board over the past five years, although oversight of the process
has shrunk during this same period.” In an interview with The Center for
Public Integrity, Walker noted “particular problems with military contract-
ing.”77 
In early 2007, Congress passed the War Profiteering Prevention Act
intended to “prohibit profiteering and fraud relating to military action, relief,
and reconstruction efforts, and for other purposes.”78 In February 2007,
then Senator Barack Obama introduced a bill aimed at closing the legal
loophole that had allowed private contractors to escape prosecution.79 But
his legislation, like other similar measures, never passed the Senate and
never became law. 
Finally, in October 2007, following the Nisour Square shooting, the
House passed legislation improving oversight over the booming security
industry. The MEJA (Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act) Expansion
and Enforcement Act (H.R. 2740) subjects all contractors in war zones, now
including also those working for the State Department, to the jurisdiction of
U.S. criminal law.80 Moreover, the fiscal year 2008 Defense (H.R. 1585) and
Intelligence (H.R. 2082) authorization bills further improves control and
oversight. “These bills together,” explains Representative David Price (D-
NC), “should dramatically change the way our government uses and over-
sees contractors on the battlefield and in sensitive intelligence areas.”81
Aware of the billing problems, President Obama, in his first address to a
joint session of Congress on February 24, 2009, promised: “We’ll eliminate
the no-bid contracts that have wasted billions in Iraq.”82 And in March, he
promised that the American people’s money will “be spent to advance their
priorities—not to line the pockets of contractors or to maintain projects
that don't work.”83
The Cost of Cost Savings
The quest to cut costs may backfire. For example, in early 2002, the U.S.
Army cut funding to its Intelligence Center’s interrogator school at Fort
Huachuca, AZ, effectively setting loose about half of its instructors. This
move, critics alleged, would “cripple the Army’s ability to properly train its
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counter-intelligence personnel at a time when intelligence assets are sorely
needed to fight the war on terrorism.”84 “What’s most astonishing,” Pratap
Chatterjee, managing director of Corpwatch.org, stated in an interview, “is
that once they lay these people off, they turn right around and hired a private
company to hire these very same people at probably double the pay to come
and work as private contractors without being assigned as part of the mili-
tary command structure, which means they’re able to go in as civilians. They
don’t face court-martial, and they can do what they want.”85
In response to the Nisour Square shootings, the State Department cre-
ated a Force Investigation Unit to look into Blackwater contractors’ alleged
use of force, effectively hiring contractors to investigate possible crimes
committed by other contractors. It is like “outsourcing henhouse security to
a fox,” industry expert David Isenberg opined.86
But apart from this conflict of interest, some experts also see a potential
violation of the law, because federal acquisition regulations do not permit
the hiring of contractors for jobs “considered to be inherently governmental
functions,” including “the direct conduct of criminal investigations.”87 
Given the explosion of contracting with little public debate or formal
policy decisions, some observers warn that “contractors have become a vir-
tual fourth branch of government.”88 But the problem goes deeper than the
flagrant cases of waste and fraud. Watchdog groups allege the following:
• Competition appears to have sharply eroded. A New York Times anal-
ysis, for example, shows that in 2005 less than half of contracts (48
percent) were competitive, down from 79 percent in 2001.
• Even the most sensitive and secret government jobs are now being
outsourced. For instance, some 70 percent of the budget for intelli-
gence collection goes to private contractors.89
• The most successful contractors may no longer be “those doing the
best work, but those who have mastered the special skill of selling to
Uncle Sam.”
• Contracting typically results in less public scrutiny, as programs are
hidden behind closed corporate doors and are not subject to the pro-
visions of the Freedom of Information Act.90
Do not Blame the Messenger
Although even the most outspoken critics acknowledge that the government
cannot function without contractors, the current trend, a recent study of
experts appointed by the White House and Congress found, “poses a threat
to the government’s long-term ability to perform its mission” and could
“undermine the integrity of the government’s decision making.”91
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But placing all the blame on the contractors would be shortsighted.
“Agencies are crippled in their ability to seek low prices, supervise contrac-
tors and intervene when work goes off course because the number of gov-
ernment workers overseeing contracts has remained level as spending has
shot up.”92 
Indeed, the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Manage-
ment in Expeditionary Operations concluded in its October 2007 report:
“The Institutional Army has not adjusted to the challenges of providing
timely, efficient, and effective contracting support to the force in Operation
Iraqi Freedom. . . . Essentially, the Army sent a skeleton contracting force
into theater without the tools or resources necessary to adequately support
our warfighters.”93 This is not surprising, given that the Army cut its con-
tracting workforce in half in the mid-1990s and has kept it stagnant since.
Yet, complexity has increased dramatically in the past decade and workload
is up by more than 600 percent.94
Doug Brooks explains: “If we don’t use contractors, then who is going to
complete those functions? And if we use contractors, we better get the con-
tracting right. Cost overruns are often related to deficiencies in contract
management and oversight. Contractors are often the ‘fall guys.’ For obvi-
ous reasons, you will not point out that problems are actually the client’s
fault. You make it to the front pages and get hammered in the headlines and
you suck it up!”95 He explains further:
Take the competitive contracts vs. noncompetitive contract numbers with a
grain of salt. Often competed contracts have to be modified in such a way that it
is administratively easier to simply re-award them to the firm that already won
the contract as an ‘urgent and compelling’ sole-sourced contract. This has been
especially true in contingency operations. It saves the government the time and
cost of rebidding the contract. And time is usually more important than money
in contingency operations.96
“It is clear,” so the House Appropriations Committee concluded, “that
DOD currently lacks the means to provide proper oversight of its service
contracts, in part because of an insufficient number of contract oversight
personnel.”97 This view is shared by experts in the field. As one former
senior army general officer remarked, “In Iraq contract management for
non-LOGCAP was a ‘pick-up game.’ When done at all, it was a secondary
function.”98
CONDUCT UNBECOMING
To industry members and critics, tighter oversight was long overdue. Singer
explains, “Even when contractors do military jobs, they remain private busi-
nesses and thus fall outside the military chain of command and justice sys-
tems.”99 Unlike military units, private companies can decide which contracts
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to take, and they can walk away from any contract and abandon operations if
they become unprofitable or too dangerous. Of course, in doing so, compa-
nies may jeopardize their prospects for repeat business.
And indeed, numerous firms delayed, suspended, or ended their opera-
tions in Iraq, leaving the military in the lurch to pick up the slack. As James
Surowiecki commented in The New Yorker, “No contract can guarantee that
private employees will stick around in a combat zone. After the Iraq War,
some contractors refused assignments to dangerous parts of the country.
That left American troops sitting in the mud, and without hot food. . . .”100
Moreover, when things go wrong, as they did in Abu Ghraib, holding
private contractors accountable for their actions has proven difficult. “It’s
bad enough,” industry watcher David Isenberg concludes, “that the CIA
[Central Intelligence Agency] has reverted to torture in its questioning of
terrorist suspects and covered up evidence by destroying the tapes; but it’s
even worse to hand these tasks over to private companies operating under
classified contracts that are themselves illegal to disclose and who are
answerable only to their stockholders.”101
The watchdog group Human Rights First arrives at a sobering assess-
ment: “The failure to investigate and prosecute these violent attacks has cre-
ated a culture of impunity that angers the local population, undermines the
military mission, and promotes more abuse by contractors over time.”102
In its investigation of the Nisour Square shooting, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation concluded that at least fourteen out of the seventeen shootings
were unjustified and that Blackwater guards had “recklessly violated Ameri-
can rules for the use of lethal force.”103 Iraqi authorities went a step further
and characterized the incident as “deliberate murder.” Nonetheless, the
guards could not be prosecuted under Iraqi law because of an immunity
proclamation made by the Coalition Provisional Authority, the governing
authority installed by American troops following the invasion. 
Dating back to a CPA order from June 2004, contractors working for
U.S. agencies were immune to Iraqi law with regard to all actions performed
in fulfilment of their contractual obligations. A June 2003 CPA notice speci-
fied the status of contractor personnel:
In accordance with international law, the CPA, Coalition Forces and the mili-
tary and civilian personnel accompanying them, are not subject to local law or
the jurisdiction of local courts. With regard to criminal, civil, administrative or
other legal process, they will remain subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
State contributing them to the Coalition.104
And CPA Order No. 17 (Section 4.3) specified that non-Iraqi “contrac-
tors shall be immune from Iraqi legal process with respect to acts performed
by them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a contract or sub-contract
thereto.” As a consequence, none of the contractors implicated in the Abu
Ghraib prison scandal were prosecuted for their abusive interrogation tech-
niques. 
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Things finally turned around in December 2008 when, in a first applica-
tion of the MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act, five Blackwater guards
were indicted for their involvement in the Nisour Square shooting. Accord-
ing to Doug Brooks, “Some fifty MEJA cases appear to be pending right
now, but that information is confidential. We are quite happy with those
developments, but we would like to see an open MEJA process. Ultimately,
it would be great to have one comprehensive bill for all contractors.”105
Self-policing of an Industry
To date, most disciplinary actions, particularly for minor offences, are still
left to the industry. Brooks knows this situation might not be ideal, but “in
any environment like that, you don’t have the luxury of boards of appeal and
courts for minor offences. What happens is the people are fired. Unfortu-
nately, that’s what you have to do in this environment.”106 
The International Peace Institute admonishes that “the absence of effec-
tive regulation leaves responsible industry players and investors without the
guidance they require, and allows less responsible players to indulge in con-
tractual fraud and price gouging, and to hide the true social and economic
costs of their activities—including violations of human rights and interna-
tional humanitarian law.”107
Even the very latest regulatory schemes fall short of providing compre-
hensive mechanisms for controlling the behavior of security firms or of indi-
vidual contractors. In September 2008, seventeen states, including the
United States, finalized the so-called Montreaux Document, the first inter-
national document to describe international law as it applies to the activities
of private military and security companies whenever these are present in the
context of an armed conflict.108 Itself not legally binding, the Montreaux
Document provides important guidance to states—there is no comparable
guidance tailored to the industry. But “The absence of effective standards
enforcement arrangements,” the International Peace Institute concludes,
“casts a pall over the industry as a whole, exposing it to claims that it does
not respect human rights.”109
While there is currently no regulatory industry standard, there are strong
incentives for companies to monitor their employees’ behavior and adopt
self-regulating mechanisms to strengthen transparency, accountability, and
predictability. Many, but far from all, of the private security firms operating
in Iraq adhere to the IPOA’s Code of Conduct, developed as an ethical stan-
dard for corporate members operating in conflict/postconflict environ-
ments. The Code of Conduct pledges IPOA members to respect human
rights; operate with integrity, honesty, and fairness; recognize and support
legal accountability; work only for legitimate and recognized governments,
international and nongovernmental organizations, and lawful private com-
panies; and ensure adequate training and vetting of their personnel.110 
As of March 2009, the IPOA serves a total of fifty-three corporate mem-
bers, all of whom have signed its Code of Conduct and have pledged to
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abide by the ethical standards established therein. And self-regulation seems
an attractive choice for many companies. IPOA membership has more than
doubled since 2006. Roland Vargoega, owner and president of Dynsec
Group, affirms: “Our membership in IPOA has helped differentiate our
company by the fact that our clients can see that we live up to the highest
standard within the industry. By such, IPOA has helped us win contracts.”111
And Brooks affirms, “[o]ne of the great misconceptions is that the indus-
try seeks to evade laws, regulations and accountability. In fact, rules and
guidelines can make commercial operations far easier, more predictable and
simpler. They also serve as a barrier for entry to less professional companies
and limit the ability of those firms to tarnish the entire industry.”112
However, at this time, there is no uniform evaluation of the IPOA or
similar corporative codes or their implementation by government agencies.
Notably though, Blackwater is missing from the IPOA member roster.113 
LIST OF ACRONYMS
CBO Congressional Budget Office
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CPA Coalition Provisional Authority
CFS Contractor field services
DOD Department of Defense
ESS Eurest support services
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
IPOA International Peace Operations Association
KBR Kellogg, Brown & Root
LOGCAP Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
MEJA Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
MRE Meal-ready-to-eat
PMC Private Military Contractor
PSC Private security company
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
SEAL Sea, Air, Land
USIS U.S. Information Service
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ABSTRACT
This case examines the benefits and limitations of outsourcing peace and
stability functions to a rapidly growing private sector and illustrates implica-
tions for civil-military cooperation in complex operations. The case traces
the history and rise of the security industry, categorizes the types of firms
providing security and security support services, illustrates the reasons and
motivations for individuals to seek employment as security contractors, and
discusses implications of the growing market for privatizing security on the
U.S. military. Finally, the case explores the advantages and shortcomings of
outsourcing security functions and illustrates some of the dilemmas associ-
ated with “security by contract.” Among others, the case wrestles with the
following questions: What is the global security industry, and where did it
come from? What are the roles of contractors in complex operations? What
are the advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing security functions?
What are the domestic and international policy implications?
BACKGROUND
Outsourcing government functions to the private sector is by no means a
new phenomenon. And hiring individuals for warfighting purposes is as old
as fighting wars itself. But never before in history have private contractors—
individual or corporate—played such a central role in providing services in
support of military missions as they do today. Indeed, there are currently
more contractors working for private security firms in Iraq than there are
military troops. And with the Obama administration’s planned withdrawal
of U.S. forces from Iraq, the balance between security provision through
government and the private sector is likely to shift further in favor of the
latter.
Supporters and critics of the booming global security industry agree that
the industry has established itself as an important player in international
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security. Especially when it comes to conducting complex contingency or
peace and stability operations, outsourcing some of the security functions
traditionally fulfilled by the military is becoming a viable, flexible, speedy,
and cost-effective alternative to deploying troops. As the IPOA’s Doug
Brooks provocatively points out: “Every military that expects to be relevant
beyond its national borders in the future will be working with the private
sector.” 
But growing demand for private security services has come at a price: As
of March 2009, there were 447 confirmed contractor casualties in Iraq, com-
pared to a total of more than 4,500 soldiers—more than 4,200 of which are
Americans (see www.icasualties.org). In addition, the industry has been rid-
dled with criticism for waste, fraud, and abuse.
THE PURPOSE OF THE CASE
The purpose of this case as a teaching tool is to familiarize students with
issues related to the outsourcing of security functions to the private sector
and to raise questions such as the following: 
• What is the global security industry, and where did it come from? 
• What are the roles of contractors in complex operations? 
• What are the advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing security
functions? 
• What motivates individuals to seek employment with a private firm?
• What are the domestic and international policy implications of using
security contractors to fulfill military/military support functions? 
Moreover, the case presents a number of policy dilemmas posed by the
trend to outsource security, including 
• the industry’s orientation toward profit maximization, which may not
always line up with the client’s interest or the public good; 
• the lack of democratic control over a rapidly growing and largely
unregulated industry; 
• the limited accountability of the industry fueled by the absence of reg-
ulations, oversight, and enforcement; 
• the shortcomings in the government’s ability to manage the explod-
ing number of contracts and insufficient contract oversight;
Security by Contractor: Outsourcing in Peace and Stability Operations 27
• the inadequate knowledge of the professional background and moti-
vations of security contractors; and
• the challenges presented to the unique status and functions of a pro-
fessional military force by a privatized security industry and to ques-
tions of military recruitment and retention. 
TEACHING THE CASE
Unlike an academic article, case studies developed for teaching purposes do
not reach definite conclusions nor do they provide specific policy recom-
mendations for how to resolve the showcased dilemmas. Quite the contrary,
they present evidence in support of both (or more) sides of a policy argu-
ment and will often leave readers with some discomfort in terms of how
dilemmas should be resolved. Therefore, this case does not derive specific
policy recommendations or “logical” conclusions. Rather, it challenges read-
ers to recognize the importance of privatizing traditional security functions,
deduce policy implications, and discern lessons that might apply to other—
perhaps even non-security-related—areas of public policy, administration,
and management. This case is written in nontechnical language and should
be appropriate for use in professional military education settings as well as in
graduate and advanced undergraduate civilian academic classrooms.
Most generally, instructors may want to start the classroom discussion
by asking a series of general questions (these could pertain to any case)
including the following:
• What is this case about?
• What is/are the problem(s) and dilemma(s) specific to the case?
• What are the larger policy implications exemplified by this case?
• Who are the main actors (for example, persons, agencies, states, orga-
nizations, companies, and so on) that make up the story? Who is the
protagonist, who the antagonist? 
• What are their respective positions/interests? How do they pursue
those interests?
For Professional/Military Students
• How are this case, the dilemmas, and the implications relevant to
YOUR experiences and organization? 
• How do they affect how you do your job?
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• How do they challenge YOUR management and leadership capabili-
ties?
After these general introductory questions, instructors may want to
show a short video illustrating some of the issues surrounding the use of
security contractors. The infamous “trophy video” depicting Aegis defense
services employees showing contractors shooting from their vehicle at traffic
may work for this. A series of very short news reports from NBC Nightly
News also provides excellent background information on a number of the
dilemmas illustrated by this case. Links to both videos are provided below. 
Specific dilemmas illustrated by this case include the following:
THE OUTSOURCING DILEMMA
Outsourcing or privatization describes the process whereby activities that
were formerly carried out by government agencies are now assigned to non-
government, for-profit agencies, usually under contract with the govern-
ment. The idea behind outsourcing is that market competition will raise the
quality of services provided while lowering costs. Especially during the Bush
administration, which operated under the belief that government should be
market based, competitive sourcing became a standard for providing gov-
ernment services. Here, the government enters into competition with the
private sector in an effort to improve performance and efficiency. The objec-
tive is to focus on the most effective and efficient way of accomplishing the
agency’s mission regardless of whether it is done by civil servants or contrac-
tors. 
Outsourcing has direct implications for organizational (military and cor-
porate) culture and management, performance assessment, and employee
motivation. Questions that might spark interesting classroom discussion
include the following:
• What are your experiences with outsourcing (very generally)? 
• Does competitive sourcing improve performance and efficiency?
What are the benefits/drawbacks?
• What are the true cost savings of outsourcing security? Is it really
cheaper—in the short term and in the long run—for the U.S. govern-
ment to rely extensively on private contractors rather than using U.S.
military personnel or civil servants?
• Is there a difference in the performance of private contractors versus
government employees/ civil servants/soldiers?
• Are contractors as committed to/motivated for public service as civil
servants/soldiers? What differences do you see?
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THE NATIONAL SECURITY DILEMMA
In addition, this case could generate a more general discussion of the priva-
tization of national security. The purpose of the military is to defend
national interests at home and abroad. The fundamental goal of corpora-
tions is to maximize profit. By the very nature of their interest in the bottom
line, firms will be tempted to increase their profits at their client’s expense.
Profit-seeking security firms are no different. 
The following questions are not necessarily intended to be asked
directly, but instructors could steer the discussion in a direction that would
allow participants to arrive at these issues on their own:
• To what degree has U.S. national security been privatized out of gov-
ernment hands to corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and
other groups? 
• What are the implications of outsourcing for national security? Are
there “core military functions” that should not be contracted out?
Which ones? Why?
• Has the United States gone too far? What kind of limits should poli-
cymakers impose when outsourcing American national security? 
• How does the trend toward privatizing security functions affect the
state’s “monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in a given terri-
tory”? What are the implications for national security?
• What impacts does the use of private contractors have on military
morale and discipline? How does it affect the ability of the uniformed
services to retain skilled military personnel in critical specialty areas?
• Does it matter whether a contractor is U.S. based or foreign? What
are the advantages and disadvantages of hiring (a) American contrac-
tors, (b) third-country nationals, or (c) locals to fulfill security-
related functions? 
Particularly the last question could lead to a discussion related to intelli-
gence-gathering and the sharing of sensitive information between military
and private security professionals with differing levels of security clearances.
It could also spark discussion about the use of security contracts for job cre-
ation and skills development at the local level.
THE OVERSIGHT DILEMMA
The case identifies contract oversight and control over contractor behavior
as a central dilemma in the outsourcing of security functions. Questions for
classroom discussion of these issues include the following:
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• Are current government contracting and procurement regulations
and management standards adequate for effective oversight over the
private security or contingency industry? 
• How can private actors be held accountable most effectively for their
actions? How can we ensure that they pursue and protect U.S. inter-
ests and follow the rules of engagement? 
• Are recent changes such as the 2007 MEJA Expansion and Enforce-
ment Act and the indictment of the Blackwater shooters sufficient to
address the problems inherent in controlling a rapidly growing indus-
try?
• How effective is self-regulation? How can adherence to an industry
Code of Conduct be ensured/enforced?
REFERENCES
In addition to the case manuscript, instructors may also want to assign sup-
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Brooks, Doug. “Testimony before the House of Representatives Com-
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in Iraq,” August 2008, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/96xx/doc9688/
08-12-IraqContractors.pdf. 
House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, “Memorandum.” October 1, 2007, at http://over-
sight.house.gov/documents/20071001121609.pdf.
Human Rights First. “Private Security Contractors at War: Ending a
Culture of Impunity.” Washington, DC, 2008, at http://www.human-
rightsfirst.info/pdf/08115-usls-psc-final.pdf.
Isenberg, David. “A Government in Search of Cover: PMCs in Iraq,”
Conference paper, prepared for “Market Forces: Regulating Private
Military Companies.” New York: New York University School of
Law, Institute for International Law and Justice. March 23–24,
2006, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/pmcs0603.pdf.
Web Sites and Other Supporting Materials
International Peace Operations Association (IPOA)
www.ipoaonline.org 
Private Security Company Association of Iraq
www.pscai.org/index.html 
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Private Military and Private Security Companies 
www.privatemilitary.org/home.html 
CorpWatch on “war and disaster profiteering”
www.corpwatch.org 
Project on Government Oversight
www.pogo.org
Videos to Show in Class
PBS Frontline “Private Warriors”
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/contrac-
tors/highrisk.html 
NBC Nightly News, in-depth look at private security contractors (sev-
eral news clips) 
http://video.msn.com/video.aspx?mkt=en-us&search=private+secu-
rity 
Aegis Defense Services shooting at civilians (“Trophy Video”)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wMzx_P0m2aY 
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POSTSCRIPT
On February 13, 2009, in response to being fired by the State Department
from its job protecting diplomats in Iraq, Blackwater USA officially changed
its tarnished name to Xe. With its new name, the company hopes to be a
“one-stop shopping source for world class services in the fields of security,
stability, aviation, training and logistics,” according to a memo by company
president Gary Jackson.114 
The division that handles protective security services is now called U.S.
Training Center, Inc. Its primary focus will be operating training facilities,
including Blackwater’s flagship campus in rural North Carolina.
Author Jeremy Scahill commented on the name change: “Blackwater’s
deadly record has clearly made the company an international symbol of the
out of control violence of the Bush era in Iraq and the rise of modern-day
mercenaries, so it is understandable why the company would try to change
its name at this moment in history.”115
At the time of the Blackwater announcement, the State Department
advertised for the latest round of security posts overseas. In an effort to end
its reliance on contracting firms like Blackwater, the Department of State is
hiring as many as seven hundred security protective specialists at an annual
salary of $52,000 plus additional danger pay and post differential up to
about 70 percent of the base salary. 
The State Department acknowledges that new hires may encounter
some fairly rigorous working conditions. The job “may require jumping,
dodging, lying prone, as well as wrestling, restraining and subduing attack-
ers, or detainees.” And after the initial tours in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Israel are
completed, employees could very well be transferred to “other high threat
posts overseas.” 
The posting specifies that specialists will be trained in the use of fire-
arms, personal defensive tactics, driving skills, emergency medical proce-
dures, and protective security techniques at a thirteen-week training session




page=1 (accessed March 19, 2009).
115. Ibid.
116. See http://www.abcnews.go.com/blotter/blackwater/story?id=6873331&
page=1 (accessed March 19, 2009).
117. For details, see http://www.state.gov/m/ds/career/ (accessed March 19,
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